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Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Ideational factors, which range from democracy to human rights, from sustainable peace 
to multilateralism, have long played an important role in the European Union’s (EU) 
foreign policies toward China, with a wide range of issues that could be found in recent 
decades such as the arms embargo, resolutions critical of China’s human rights in United 
Nations Commission of Human Rights (UNCHR), and many other fields in EU-China 
relations. Despite the significance of ideational factors, it is tempting but premature to 
conclude that the EU’s external policies towards China have been dominated by 
normative power. The policy preference of the EU towards China is affected by the role 
of institutions in facilitating the emergence of a sense of community based on shared 
norms, interests and a common identity. Yet EU positions, decision and actions in the 
world are produced as the result of often complex interactions in a multi-level system, 
involving the member states singly and collectively, as well as the common institutions 
(Hill and Smith, 2005). Would such complex interactions bring some kind of convergence 
in a normative European policy towards China? How does China respond to the 
emergence of ideational factors in bilateral relations? Does China see the EU as a 
normative power? Thus, social constructivist tools should be applied to analyze the 
emergence of ideational factors as a consequence of both internal interaction within the 
EU and external interaction between Europe and China.  
 
I will focus my research on the notion of Normative Power Europe (NPE) by examining 
the role of ideational factors in EU’s foreign and security policies toward China, as well 
as China’s perception of EU’s promotions and pressures in these values through case 
studies. More specifically, the study is a two-step process. The first stage is to explore the 
different goals of multiple European actors and how these goals interact with normative 
factors in shaping their foreign policy towards China. In this stage, analytical target is not 
restricted to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or European Commission 
(EC) level, but takes into account member states’ positions and foreign policies toward 
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China. In the second stage, China’s perception of Europe’s normative driven policies will 
be introduced, by looking into the response of Beijing and relevant literature. This 
research attempts to explain the lack of a normative convergence in EU and reveal 
China’s perception in EU’s normative power. 
 
1.2 Theoretical Framework  
 
There are some methodological assumptions underlying European studies, such as the 
methodological pluralism. No single approach comes near being adequate by itself in 
providing a sound explanation. The EU is neither a state nor a traditional alliance, and it 
therefore represents a heterodox unit of analysis (Andreatta, 2005). In our case, liberal-
intergovernmentalism and constructivism together would best serve our purpose as 
liberal-intergovernmentalism envisages a world in which governments act on two arenas 
(the domestic and the international) simultaneously and constructivism emphasizes the 
importance of cognitive factors in the elaboration of foreign policy and the fact that states 
do not seek only material objectives but are also inspired by ideological motivations 
(Andreatta, 2005).  
 
Liberal-intergovernmentalism 
 
The theoretical analysis of European foreign policy towards China should rest on the 
significant role that Member States play in policy formulation and implementation, with 
their domestically-generated interests and policy preferences. This is not only true at the 
intergovernmental CFSP level for each Member State, but also at the European 
Commission level, where the sharing of competences and Member States’ supervision of 
the Commission do not exclude the application of intergovernmentalist approaches. In a 
liberal-intergovernmentalist perspective, Member States are the basis of European foreign 
policy toward China and they are the principal decision-makers within the three policy 
levels of European Commission external relations, the CFSP, and of course their own 
national foreign policies. 
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Intergovernmentalism distinguishes from realism and neo-realism as it recognizes the 
significance of European institutionalization in EU-China relations and the impact of 
domestic factors, including ideational factors, upon policy preferences. Institutions do 
matter in defining and shaping Member States’ interests and policy preferences. 
Institutions favor processes of socialization and Europeanization; they establish norms of 
behavior that require convergence and logic of appropriateness. Besides, institutions 
could involve supranational actors which can wield significant powers in the terms of 
Commission actions regarding EC external relations and in terms of networks of 
representatives in the case of the CFSP.  
 
Constructivism 
 
Constructivist approach sees European institutions as a normative entity. At a minimum 
level, the fact that the EU exists creates pressures to preserve its unity, and develops a 
consistent bias toward common, rather than national, positions and at a maximum, the 
existence of the EU as an institution which embodies certain principles – democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights, free markets – creates an incentive for states to sustain those 
same objectives and constitute a “European” identity (Andreatta, 2005). In this sense, 
states which are part of the process become socialized with institutional aims and with 
those of other members, and thus institutions allow governments to become intimately 
acquainted with the goals, aversions, tastes and domestic constraints of each other 
(Sandholtz, 1996). Having provided a normative framework within the EU, it then could 
project these instincts externally. 
 
Internally, Member States’ interests and policy preferences both at EU and domestic 
levels are assumed to be initially formed within their national boundaries but then also 
obviously shaped through the interaction within EU institutions, where various 
supranational and transnational actors enjoy certain level of influence. Externally, 
pressures from China on Member States’ preferences and interests are significant in 
explaining the European policy outcomes but only if they are conceived, in a 
constructivist perspective, as being filtered through EU institutions.  
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Moreover, constructivism could serve as a bridge linking analysis of EU’s policies on 
China with China’s perception of EU. In a constructivist perspective, the structure of EU-
China relations is determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and 
that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas 
rather than given by nature. Constructivism creates necessary room for identities and 
interests of international actors like EU. Constructivists also see such identities and 
interests as the result of ideas and the social construction of such ideas (Wendt, 1999). In 
the literature on NPE, EU identity greatly contributes to the formulation and 
implementation of EU foreign policy. Therefore, when analyzing the explanatory power 
of identity in the European foreign policies toward China, it is necessary to consider the 
interaction among EU identity and those of its Member States. 
 
1.3 Research Questions, Hypotheses, and Case Selection 
 
The research questions in this paper involve three parts. The first one defines the terms 
and scope of this research. The most important one, i.e. the second one, looks into the 
divergence among multiple EU actors. The third one offers feedback of the EU’s 
normative policy – displaying a systematic review of Normative Power Europe. 
 
1. Ideational Factors: What ideational factors affect the EU-China relations? What is the 
content of Normative Power Europe towards China? 
 
This question mainly addresses the problem of definition and scope in this research. As 
previously discussed, ideational factors can range from peace, liberty, democracy, the rule 
of law, and respect for human rights to social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable 
development and good governance. In EU-China relations, are these factors all present or 
equally addressed? In this part, a discourse analysis of the notion of “Normative Power 
Europe”, starting with the early debate between “Civilian Power Europe” and “Military 
Power Europe” would also be developed in the form of literature review on the 
discussion of NPE and its impact on Europe’s foreign policy. 
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2. A normative convergence toward China in EU’s Policy? 
 
The asymmetrical nature of the EU’s foreign policy process across member states and 
institutions is well documented. There is significant variation within the policy towards 
China owing to the different political, economic and social features of the individual 
member states. Thus, the question would be: is the interaction of ideational motives 
within the European foreign policy-making system leading to a normative convergence 
toward China? If so why? If not, then why not? This question attempts to explain the 
notable phenomenon that EU member states’ commitments to pursuing a normative 
foreign policy toward China varied significantly.  
 
I assume that there are two crucial independent variables that influence the degree of 
pursuing a common normative policy.  
 
The first one is about the size or power of the Member State. According to liberal-
intergovernmentalist arguments, the frequency and intensity of the clash between self-
interest and promoting European norms is often proportional to a state’s power. As small 
states in Europe have fewer and less complicated relations with China, their normative 
initiatives are less likely to conflict with their strategic or economic interests in China. On 
the contrary, large states like France and Germany have more complex interests in China, 
which will often conflict with assertive normative policy. The measurement of the actors’ 
political and economic power would be based on a systematic assessment of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), its percentage of trade volume with China out of its total 
foreign trade volume, as well as empirical observations of its political influence both 
within the EU and the international arena. 
 
While from a constructivist view, domestic political culture is another independent 
variable. For example, Nordic countries and Netherlands are welfare states, which share a 
social democratic tradition, whose attachment to norms such as peace-keeping and human 
rights are stronger than average European level. When their political tradition are 
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reflected in foreign policy, it’s not strange for them to have spoken out vigorously on 
normative issues while their goals are not always shared by other Member States with 
different domestic political culture. The measurement of this variable brings about 
another big project of political culture studies. An earlier research on political culture 
conceptualized it broadly as “the important ways in which people are subjectively 
oriented toward the basic elements of their political system” (Rosenbaum, 1975). 
Generally speaking, political culture research focuses on the nation-state, comparing how 
citizens or institutions of states vary in their political norms and most studies were based 
on national or cross-national sample surveys and operationally defined culture in terms of 
the political beliefs, values, attitudes and opinions of mass publics. There exists a rich 
literature on political culture of the EU in a regional level and its member states in a 
national level and a great many aspects are covered. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this 
research, we mainly focus on the impact of different political cultures on shaping state 
policies and politics. More specifically this research tends to group political actors into 
two categories: those with a “thicker” democratic or liberal political culture and those 
with less “density” of democratic or liberal norms. The criteria in grouping mainly apply 
that used by the International Social Survey Program and European Social Survey. 
 
Accordingly, my hypotheses are as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The larger the political power and economic size an EU member state has, 
the more likely that it will pursue an assertive common normative policy towards China. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A “thicker” or more influencing democratic or liberal political culture an 
EU member state has, the more unlikely that it will pursue an assertive common 
normative policy towards China. 
 
These two hypotheses would be tested by cases studies in EU-China relations. I have 
selected four cases: two in high politics, i.e. arms embargo and the promotion of human 
rights and the rule of law, and two in low politics, i.e., the promotion of relevant norms in 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the EU’s Raw Material Diplomacy. These 
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four cases have covered the major frictions in the EU-China relations and through the 
combination of both high and low politics issues we can examine the influence of another 
possible independent variable: the nature of the issue. I assume that a convergence in a 
common normative policy is more likely to exist in low politics issues while less likely to 
exist in high politics issues. 
 
3. China’s Perception: Is Europe a normative actor in international relations? The 
question is not only based on the perception within Europe, but also depends on the 
perception from China. Therefore the question would be: how do Chinese officials and 
scholars perceive these ideational factors? Do they see EU as a normative power?  
 
This part starts with reviewing current empirical studies on the effects of ideational 
factors in EU-China relations and proceeds with tracing the process of our four cases by 
focusing on the reaction of China. 
 
1.4 Data Collection and Method of Analysis 
 
A case study method and comparative analysis are applied in this research. The main 
advantages of a case study method in this research include identifying and examining 
intervening variables in individual cases which may be omitted by the mere definition of 
NPE, developing historical explanations of particular cases on EU-China relationship, 
and using contingent generalizations to model complex relationships such as multiple 
interactions effects in the formation of EU’s China policy.  
 
Based on a multilevel approach, Member States are at the centre of the analysis and act 
on both the national and the European level and pursue their polices on the European 
level. This bargaining set contains national policy based on policy preferences, basic 
values, and strategic interest. However, it is rather difficult to include all Member States 
in each case and make comparison among all. For research simplicity, I investigate the 
interests and policy preferences towards China of four exemplar Member States: the “big 
three” (France, the UK, and Germany) and the Netherlands. Firstly, from a liberal 
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intergovernmental perspective, the “big three” are the Member States with the strongest 
political leverage and at the same time the most significant economic relations with 
China. An analysis of the “big three” serves the theoretical purpose of assessing our first 
hypothesis as their domestic influence, internal interaction and dynamics largely affect 
the policy outcome of the EU’s foreign policy toward China, though it is not enough to 
merely assess their cases. Comparison with relatively smaller countries is also necessary 
to draw a valid conclusion. Therefore the Netherlands is included in the analysis as the 
fourth exemplar country. Secondly, the Netherlands are among those states with typical 
liberal political culture. The Nordic countries and the Netherlands are famous for the 
promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Besides, the reputation of the 
Hague as the centre or “capital” of international justice makes the Netherlands of 
particular significance. Hence, the analysis of the Dutch policy can examine the second 
hypothesis. 
 
In the respect of data colleting, extensive investigation of archival an academic materials 
is necessary. Also, as above mentioned, operationalization of variables would make use 
of established social research databases. Besides secondary source in both Chinese and 
English scholarship, relevant sources from EU/China’s official policies statements, 
speeches of leaders, meetings and conference minutes are also utilized in this research. 
Moreover, interviews with Chinese scholars and officials in relevant fields serve as 
favorable supplements to my research. 
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Chapter 2   Contextualizing the Study: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Theories of the EU’s Foreign Policy 
 
Theoretical work on EU integration is characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity, 
divided along paradigmatic lines between realism, liberalism and various alternative 
approaches such as constructivism. This part briefly introduces the theoretic background 
of EU Foreign Policy Analysis. Classical explanations like Federalism and neo-
functionalism would be first introduced and the debate among realists, liberals and 
constructivists will be outlined as well. 
 
In the early stages, federalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism had great impacts on 
European integration. These three theories differ in some ways but they do share a 
common idea, i.e., supranational institutions play an important role in the integration. 
Federalists believe that peace and stability in Europe can only be achieved by the 
establishment of a European federal state (Mitrany, 1965). Initially, states integrate in 
limited functional or economic areas; thereafter, partially integrated states experience 
increasing momentum for further rounds of integration in related areas – this “invisible 
hand” of integration phenomenon was termed “spill-over” by the neo-functionalist school 
(McCormick, 1999). Neo-functionalism describes and explains the process of regional 
integration with reference to how three causal factors interact with one another: growing 
economic interdependence between nations, organizational capacity to resolve disputes 
and build international legal regimes, and supranational market rules that replace national 
regulatory regimes (Haas, 1961).  Neo-functionalist theory assumes a decline in 
importance of nationalism and the nation-state; it predicted that, gradually, elected 
officials, interest groups, and large commercial interests within states would see it in their 
interests to pursue welfarist objectives best satisfied by the political and market 
integration at a higher, supranational level (Haas, 1958). However, so far we have found 
no support to this assumption: supranational actors do not exist in CFSP or the EU. 
 
Realists are in general skeptical about the progress in political integration. After the 
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collapse of bipolar structure, John Mearsheimer published his famous work, Back to the 
Future, in which he explains that the US hegemony and balance of power are two main 
reasons behind European integration in the bipolar era and after the Cold War, the 
European states would worry about the uneven distribution of interests, which would 
make cooperation become increasingly difficult (Mearsheimer, 1990). Waltz also 
predicted the future of European integration after the bipolar system. Though Waltz’s 
view is not as pessimistic as Mearsheimer’s, he contended that “it has moved so far 
toward unity that it can go no farther; the easier steps toward unity come earlier, the 
harder ones later, and the hardest of all at the end (Waltz, 1993).” 
 
The liberal paradigm is more easily adapted to explain European integration and the 
emergence of a European CFSP. On the one hand, liberals adopt a more flexible approach 
than realists on the question of actors in international politics, allowing also for a role of 
supranational organizations; on the other hand, they are more optimistic on the prospects 
of interstate cooperation and are therefore more willing to acknowledge the success of the 
EC and the EU (Andreatta, 2005). The debate has produced the liberal-
intergovernmentalist school which believes that governments negotiate at the 
supranational level only on those issues which are favored by their domestic 
constituencies, since their primary interest is in being elected (Moravsik, 1998). 
Moravcsik uses a three-step process to define his theory: the first step is “domestic 
preference formation”, also called policy demand; the second one is “interstate 
bargaining”, also called policy supply (Moravcsik argues that agreements at this level are 
the result of asymmetrical interdependence, in other words, the outcomes of international 
bargaining between states are determined by the preferences and bargaining power of 
states.); the last step is “supranational institutions”, which, once created in Europe, tend 
to make cooperation more likely for reasons like reduction of negotiation transaction 
costs or more autonomy of national governments from citizens, achieved by adding 
legitimacy and credibility to common policies (Moravcsik, 1998). 
 
Nevertheless, constructivists contend that Moravcsik’s understanding of the relationship 
between domestic politics and state interests is simplistic as he is left without an 
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explanation of where state interests come from. Constructivist accounts offer a way of 
studying European political integration that is different from that of rationalist theories, in 
that they see ideas and norms as in part constituting the political realm, rather than being 
essentially intervening variables as in rationalist accounts. The primary idea of 
constructivism is that many core aspects of international relations are socially constructed. 
In other words, they are given their form by ongoing processes of social practice and 
interaction. Alexander Wendt identifies the two increasingly accepted basic tenets of 
constructivism: “the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared 
ideas rather than material forces” and “the identities and interests of purposive actors are 
constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt, 1999). In a 
nutshell, constructivist approaches emphasize the importance of norms, identity and other 
cognitive factors. 
 
2.2 The Notion of Normative Power Europe 
 
The notion of NPE could be taken as a re-interpretation of “Civilian power Europe”. In 
the early 1970s, François Duchêne claimed that traditional military had given way to 
progressive civilian power as the means to exert influence on international affairs while 
Europe can only be represented as a “civilian power” which was long on economic power 
and relatively short on armed force. Furthermore, he is also interested in the normative 
power of EC as an “idea force” (Duchêne, 1972). It was not until Ian Manners’s article on 
normative power published in 2002 that the academic debate got rolling again. He 
proposes a collective identity for the Union as a “normative power”, which seeks to avoid 
the civilian/military dichotomy in favor of a focus upon the “ideational impact of the 
EU’s international identity/role” (Manners, 2002). Normative power thus both 
encompasses and complements the Union’s civilian power and “fledgling military power” 
through an ideational dimension which potentially provides the “ability to shape 
conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations” (Manners, 2002). The EU collective 
identity proposed by Manners emanates from three sources: its genesis as an explicit 
rejection of the divisive nationalisms, imperialism and war of Europe’s past; its unique 
character as a “hybrid polity”; and the development, over the past 50 years, of a body of 
 18 
values which are firmly embedded in successive Treaties and in the Union’s practices 
(Manners, 2002). By examining the case study of EU’s international pursuit of the 
abolition of death penalty, which ended up with an emergence as a global standard, 
Manners gave a best illumination of NPE. Manners started with the assumption that the 
specificity of the European Union based on post-Westphalian norms, in other words to 
shift the focus for assessing and interpreting Europe’s role beyond the usual focus on 
means of power. Manners considers this preference on norms as respect to the principles 
on which the political integration of Europe has been based since 1950. He identifies five 
core values – peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights – 
and four subsidiary values – social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable 
development and good governance – as contributing to the Union’s presence (Manners, 
2002). It is in projecting these values, and promoting the establishment of related norms 
for the governance of international behavior, that the EU might be said to exercise 
normative power (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006). 
 
Undoubtedly, the Union’s proclaimed values feature frequently in documentation and in 
the rhetoric of EU representatives. Those core values which the Union claims to observe 
and seeks to project makes the implicit identity statements based upon its difference from 
and superiority over other global actors, most notably the US (Bretherton and Vogler, 
2006). Charles Kupchan has noted the practices of EU representatives in constructing a 
value-based identity distinct from that of the US and he cites differences with the US over 
the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, the International Criminal Court and the death 
penalty as evidences of EU “resistance” to US leadership (Kupchan, 2002). Thus, the 
question would be: are the Union’s attempts to assert and project its values and to shape 
the practices of the third parties evident and dominant in EU’s foreign policy? 
 
A recent empirical study carried out by Tocci on the EU’s foreign policy and that of its 
main global partners including China, aims clarify the under-specified literature on EU 
normative foreign policy dominated by Ian Manners’ conceptualization of Normative 
Power Europe. Tocci claimed that the European Union is itself a new or emerging foreign 
policy actor, driven by self-declared normative principles, while China, Russia and India 
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are also increasingly assertive actors on the global stage and similarly claim to be driven 
by a normative agenda (Tocci, 2007). Balducci pointed out the majority of Tocci’s 
literature presents two major shortcomings. First, it tends to merely analyze EU foreign 
policy leaving aside the foreign policies of the member states, uncritically assuming that 
they are in line with those of the EU; second, it tends to reify the EU and to conceive it as 
a single international actor (Balducci, 2008). Therefore, it is necessary to examine the 
normative convergence within the EU in terms of important foreign relations such as EU-
China relations. 
 
2.3 Issues in EU-China Relations  
 
The current reality is that the alleged EU-China strategic partnership has encountered a 
number of difficulties. Though some critical issues, such as Taiwan, are not causing 
major friction, other normative factors have a significant impact on the relationship. The 
human rights issue is an obvious example. 
 
The influence of human rights issues in China-EU relationship is significant because of 
its normative nature. The German Chancellor’s approach to this issue, through direct 
meetings with the Dalai Lama, has greatly constrained Sino-German relations (Xiang, 
2009). The French approach of accommodation will face increasing pressure from other 
EU member states. Starting from the year 1990, the EU and its member states had 
followed the practice of tabling or sponsoring resolutions critical of China at the annual 
meetings of the UN Commission for Human Rights (Baker, 2002). On the first 
Commission Communication on China of 1995, EU and its members put main policies 
and instruments to constructively engage China and promote human rights in China. The 
Communication also marked the beginning of a “division of labor” between the CFSP, in 
charge of pursuing a critical stance towards China, and the EC, responsible to apply 
positive conditionality to the country (Möller, 2002). Since 1997, EU-China cooperation 
on Chinese legal reform has been considered the more practical approach to promoting 
political changes; however this new approach to the human rights situation in China has 
been criticized by large segments of the public in Europe (Xiang, 2009). After 1998 all 
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EU member states abandoned the tabling of resolutions at the UNCHR since membership 
of the Union and the Unionization of the member states’ human rights foreign policy had 
watered down the commitment of the more radical member states (Andrew, 1999).  
 
The arms embargo has also been portrayed by EU and its member states as another issue 
where unanimity exists. After Tiananmen incident, France developed a non-official 
relationship with Taipei to whom it sold a large amount of weapons and China retaliated 
by excluding French companies from the Chinese market and closing the French 
Consulate in Guangzhou in 1992. In response, the French Government capitulated in 
January 1994 and signed an agreement that not only banned France from selling more 
arms to Taiwan but also offered recognition of China’s sovereignty over the island (Xiang, 
2009). In the latter half of the 1990s, although EU governments held inconclusive 
consultations on the eventual termination of the arms embargo, MEPs (Member of the 
European Parliament) demanded a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue in 1997 after 
Taiwan Strait crisis and maintained the arms embargo to Beijing. In 2003, pushing for 
acquiescing at Chinese requests, Germany and France proposed the lifting of the arms 
embargo on European Council held in Brussels, motivating it on the basis of China’s 
improvements in the respect of human rights since Tiananmen incident (Niccola, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the suggestion of lifting the arms embargo on China has incurred strong 
opposition even in France. In the end, EU decided to postpone the lifting of the arms 
embargo due to international (America) and internal (Nordic countries) pressures. The 
adoption by China of an Anti-Secession Law aimed at Taiwan in March 2005 convinced 
most EU members to postpone any decision on this issue. German Chancellor Merkel 
opposed any lifting of the embargo and as befits a typical East German politician, seems 
very keen in making direct linkages between human rights issues and the arms embargo 
(Xiang, 2009). By examining the cases of arm embargo on China, Kreutz highlighted the 
clash between norms and rationale within EU’s security strategy (Kreutz, 2004). 
 
Besides the high politics issues above, some fresh disputes with respect to international 
issues of low politics nature are also brewing. For example, China is still quite slow in 
heeding the world’s public opinion on the dangers of global warming. China’s record of 
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pollution at home and the failure of the EU to convince China to accept stricter 
greenhouse gas emission regulations have also frustrated EU member states. 
Environmental protection is also part of the CSR concept which the EU has been actively 
promoting internationally, especially in newly emerging powers such as China. A lot of 
international standards and norms are initiated by European countries; for instance the 
EITI was first brought by the then British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Another lately 
discussed issue is the EU’s Communication on the Raw Materials Initiative (RMI) as the 
EU is highly dependent on imports of raw materials for its industry. The dependency rate 
for minerals ranges from 48% for copper ore and 78% for nickel to 100% for materials 
such as cobalt, platinum, and titanium (Gregow, 2011). Due to this import dependency, 
the EU’s raw materials strategy places particular attention on fighting export restrictions, 
including export taxes, bans and regulated exports. In 2008, the EC presented its RMI 
and has since then worked to implement it. In February 2011, an update on the RMI titled 
“Tackling the challenges in Commodity markets and on raw materials” was presented to 
the public, setting the stage for future actions.  
 
The aim and measures of the initiative and the integrated approach it takes in regard to 
resource polices are placed in a sustainable development context and reflects one of the 
four subsidiary values previously mentioned. The EU sees itself to be highly dependent 
on imports from China, as it accounted for 97% of the world production in 2009 (Sydow, 
2011); yet the means the EU wants to apply in order to take part in this distributive 
conflict are highly hypercritical. Instead of starting a global dialogue and negotiating for 
binding rules and regulation in a level playing field, the EU is actually using means and 
methods it also criticizes other countries for, especially China; thus civil society and 
affected communities especially in Africa, Asia and Latin America have to pay the costs 
for this global race (Sydow, 2011). The RMI mentions the aim of promoting the 
application of EU standards by EU companies operating in the developing countries, 
which indicates that compliance with these standards and principles could then be on the 
agenda of EU-China trade relations. 
 
The former director-general of the EC’s trade department, Mogens Peter Carl, pointed out 
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that “China restricts its exports but allows local companies to use and transform them into 
finished products – that’s what the conflict is about (Hoffmeister, 2011)”. In October 
2010, German companies complained that “they were being pressured by Beijing to boost 
their investment in China if they wanted to secure access to rare earth minerals 
(Hoffmeister, 2011)”. Worse still, the conflict is growing further and further in 
consequence of the growing global demand and competition with China as well as other 
new emerging economies such as India, Brazil, Russia who aim for rapid industrialization 
and development will make the conflict difficult to tackle. Thus, the so-called low politics 
issues are actually bringing fiercer political debates both in bilateral relationship and in 
international stage.  
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Chapter 3   Cases Studies on the EU’s Foreign Policy Towards China 
 
3.1 Arms Embargo  
 
The killing of protesters in the Tiananmen Square Event in 1989 provoked international 
outrage and many countries adopted sanctions against China afterwards, which included 
an arms embargo. The EU’s collective declaration that “in the present circumstances the 
European Council thinks it necessary to adopt the following measures…interruption by 
the member states of the community of military cooperation and an embargo on trade in 
arms with China (Madrid European Council, 1989)” has established an embargo yet it 
actually did not have any legally binding effect. Nevertheless, since this declaration was 
made, the arms embargo has become a symbolic message delivering the EU’s values in 
human rights and democracy. Different pursuit and interpretation of national interests and 
priorities in foreign policies resulted in a non-decision in lifting the embargo although 
campaigns calling for lifting the embargo were initiated several times over the past years. 
Could we see the failure of lifting the embargo as the victory of the European values such 
as human rights and democracy in this case? I will examine the attitude and decisions of 
the four countries, i.e., France, Germany, the UK and the Netherlands, in the arms 
embargo case to examine the role of ideational factors in decision making. 
 
The division within the EU could be simply regarded as a debate between the “pro-
lifting” camp led by France and the “anti-lifting camp” led by the Netherlands and the 
Nordic countries. The four typical EU member states selected above have very different 
strategic paradigms, structure and orientation of their defense industries and their 
individual interpretations of the arms embargo in the debate, which can provide a 
relatively comprehensive reflection of factors affecting the final decision-making.  
 
France 
 
France’s call for lifting was actually a top-down decision made by the then President 
Jacques Chirac. Although France was one of the most vocal countries in criticizing the 
 24 
Chinese government after the Tiananmen event, just as our hypothesis explains, strategic 
and economic calculations would prioritize ideational factors like human rights 
performance. In fact, France is the country that, among the EU Member States, interprets 
the arms embargo most narrowly. “From a French perspective, the arms embargo covered 
lethal weapons and major weapons platforms, while it allowed the export of non-lethal 
systems and dual-use items such as electronics for ships and aircrafts, non-combat 
platforms, optoelectronic devices, transmitters, radars etc (Stumbaum, 2009).” Moreover, 
it is France that has been the biggest European arms exporter to China, “accounting for 
roughly 65 per cent of all EU arms sales to China since the imposition of the embargo 
(Stumbaum, 2009)”. Obviously, if a lifting of the embargo would be successful, it would 
be more economically beneficial to France compared to other Member State. The French 
industry would then greatly profit from export of high tech products and grand contracts 
with China. Besides, taking international competition into consideration, it could be 
observed that France was competing with the US in arms sales and more or less it felt 
necessary to get rid of the restrictions of an EU black list. Lifting the arms embargo in 
China would ensure an increase in arms sales: “French defense companies initially shared 
their visions of increasing their share of Chinese defense market; in particular, the 
companies hoped to win ‘grand contracts’ for civilian products such as satellites, 
telecommunication systems, nuclear power plants and high speed rail system (Stumbaum, 
2009).” 
 
On top of economic interests, France also had other reasons to campaign for a lifting, for 
example, France’s promotions of a “multipolar world”. France has long been supporting 
the strategic partnership with China and a stronger China would balance the US. Thus, it 
is the France’s strategic calculation to strengthen China and build the multipolar 
international system. Therefore, among the EU Member State, France was the one that 
has been most in favor of lifting the arms embargo in China. Publicly, France called the 
embargo “discriminating” and outdated in times when the EU was entertaining a strategic 
partnership with China (Stumbaum, 2009). 
 
Yet, we should also notice that President’s top-down decision was not widely welcomed 
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domestically. In 2004, to show their opposition and un-satisfaction of China’s human 
rights performance, “almost half of the French National Assembly members refused to 
attend the official speech by the Chinese President Hu Jintao (Gupta, 2004)”. In other 
words, human rights performance remained a big concern for French politicians or 
ideational factor did affect politicians’ decisions but limitedly. 
 
The UK 
 
Based on our hypothesis and analysis of the French case, it would be reasonable that 
countries with stronger political and economic power should be in the pro-lifting camp. 
However, this is not exactly the case for the UK, although for strategic and commercial 
reasons the UK should do so. This is why at the very beginning the UK had supported, 
though cautiously, the France’s decision to lift the arms embargo but in the end the UK 
did not agree the actual lifting, preferring to update the embargo instead. 
 
In terms of strategic concerns, it is undeniable that the UK generally supports a “unipolar 
world” where the US and the EU working hand in hand with each other and accordingly 
contain China. However, improving relations with China is also vital to the UK as long as 
it seeks “to further the British commercial interest in the PRC, while also promoting the 
political objectives of integrating China into the world’s community more closely” 
(Stumbaum, 2009). Hence, in 1998 – a year after the peaceful handover of Hong Kong – 
British diplomats had argued in an internal paper that “Britain would do well to lift the 
embargo for commercial reasons and for the advancement of the overall relationship” 
(Stumbaum, 2009). In other words, just like France, the UK is also afraid that opposing 
the lifting would harm its defense industry and non-defense-related commerce. Yet, 
unlike France, the UK cannot strongly support the lifting since it is restricted by its 
alliance relationship with the US. The UK’s non-wavering loyalty to the USA has decided 
that the UK cannot easily play a high profile role like the France did in the lifting 
campaign. 
 
In the UK case, we can identify another influential element that decides foreign policy 
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choices on top of commercial and strategic interests – external actors. When the British 
government was facing the pressure from both domestically and the US, it became 
difficult for the UK to prioritize economic interests, which explains the UK’s unsettling 
position in the debate. 
 
Germany 
 
During the debate, the then German chancellor Gerhard Schröder supported the lifting as 
it is also of the Germany’s interests to integrate China into the international community 
and develop strategic partnership with China. In fact, Germany had been working 
towards a European foreign policy that engages China. “After Germany had made good 
experiences in cooperating with China in international organizations, Schröder teamed up 
with the French president Chirac in order to reward China with an ‘honorary 
declaration’(Ehrenerklarung) by removing the ‘discriminatory’ embargo (Stumbaum, 
2009).”  
 
In terms of arms business, Schröder was promoting “package deals” where “companies 
such as the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company could sell civilian aircrafts 
(Airbus) and also military helicopters (Eurocopter) in a combined deal (Stumbaum, 
2009).” The focus was more on non-defense products since the EU arms embargo was 
implemented by Germany’s national law and thus defense-related business has been 
strictly restricted by German arms export rules. In addition to pure commercial interests, 
Schröder also had to support the lifting to gain China’s support in the UN. Germany was 
at that time hoping for a permanent seat at the Security Council. Without China’s support 
this would be impossible. Given all these into accounts, Schröder supported the lifting 
without any human rights situation improvement in return. 
 
Unfortunately, Chancellor’s stance was not supported by the government and the 
parliamentary majority due to human rights controversies. It also seemed that the call for 
multi-polarity by Schröder was not generally accepted by domestic politicians either. 
Basically, the conservatives worried about the already subtle relationship with the US and 
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the human rights conscious parties insisted that policy change could only be made until 
China made gestures in improving its human rights situation. 
 
The Netherlands 
 
The Dutch were also facing the same concerns with the “big three”, such as jeopardizing 
the trading relations with China; and therefore the then Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter 
Balkenende announced that the Netherlands was not against the decision to update the 
arms embargo. However, being a country with long-term liberal traditions in defending 
human rights and international justice, the government had to make political compromise 
under pressure of domestic and international lobby groups. For example, international 
civil society based in The Hague pressed the Dutch government to urge China to improve 
its human rights situation in exchange for Dutch decision to lift the embargo. The UNPO, 
for instance, claimed that “the human rights situation in China should have the full 
attention of the Dutch government (UNPO, 2004).” 
 
As a result, for the Dutch politicians pressure did not only come from the parliament or 
domestic lobby groups active in liberal norms promotion, but also from international civil 
society since a lot of them are based in the Hague. Constrained by these parties, the 
Netherland had no choice but to maintain the embargo. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By the end of 2004, after numerous debates and swings from side to side the Council 
finally declared that it would lift the embargo. Nevertheless, when it seemed that Member 
States in the pro-lifting camp were winning, internal and external pressure postponed the 
decision in 2005. This time, concerns more or less surrounded the security issues as in the 
year of 2005 China passed the “anti-secession law” which stated that military means 
would be taken if Taiwan declared formal independence. Consequently the US increased 
pressure on the EU and the EU itself felt the “China threat” more concretely. Thus, 
eventually the dual force of internal opposition and external factors made the debates end 
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up with a de facto non-decision in lifting. Interestingly, not long after the postponement, 
the EU made an gesture closely linking lifting to China’s improvement in human rights 
performance that “the EU and its member states reached a common position on the lifting 
of the arms embargo towards China, which was linked to the Chinese compliance with 
four main requirements: (i) the need for Chinese authorities to release citizens imprisoned 
in connection with the suppression of the 1989 pro-democracy movement; (ii) the need to 
ease media censorship; (iii) the need for reform of China’s ‘Re-education through Labor’ 
system; and (iv) the need for the PRC to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Balducci, 2010).” Although it looks like that all Member States 
expressed their claims in terms of human rights, the truth was that Member States 
“positions on the China issue in particular do not seem to emerge from socialization into 
the EU’s norms (Erickson, 2011)”. 
 
A closer look at different concerns of the four countries in the whole debate has revealed 
the conflicting strategic interests the EU faced. Clinging to normative values such as 
human rights might harm commercial benefits while improving relations with China 
might cause tension with the US. From the analysis above we can observe that the 
motives for lifting the embargo were actually the same among the Member States: 
commercial considerations and the strategic partnership relationship with China. While 
human rights controversies were definitely the common reason against lifting, external 
actors such as the US and international organizations were also playing important roles. 
 
The final non-decision on the lifting reflected the different calculations of foreign policy 
priorities. The gap among the EU Member States regarding economic and strategic 
interests determines that the EU is far from having a common European strategy to exert 
normative power internationally. Nevertheless, ideational factors did play a significant 
role in shaping the foreign policy, which can be seen the strong lobby groups in the 
parliament from political parties and other social groups in the Netherlands case. 
 
3.2 Human Rights and the Rule of Law 
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From the debates about whether to lift the arms embargo or not we can actually observe 
that human rights can be seen as signaling a value-oriented EU policy. Opponents of the 
lifting might have security concerns such as modifying the security scenario in East Asia, 
with particular reference to Taiwan or they are afraid of a stronger China in military 
power; yet direct causes go to the grave human rights situation in China. 
 
“Human rights must be at the core of all EU foreign policy (Commission’s China 
Strategy Paper, 1995).” It is also written in the official document that “to support China’s 
transition to an open society based upon the rule of law and respect for human rights 
(Delegation of the European Union to China, 2012)” is one of the four aspects of the 
EU’s China policy. In practice, the EU’s human rights policy is driven by a combination 
of the EU institutions and the Member States. At the supranational level, we have the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Parliament (EP) while at the national 
level we have Member States strengthening the EU’s legitimacy in promoting human 
rights and the rule of law internationally. 
 
China, an authoritarian state in the eyes of most Westerners, has long been criticized by 
the Europeans for its human rights abuses. Thus, the question would be whether the EU, 
which put human rights “at the core of all EU foreign policy”, would prioritize human 
rights over other interests and “speak with one voice”? In this case study, we look at the 
attitude of the selected EU Member States in the engagement between China and the EU 
in human rights disputes as well as the tools or instruments they apply in the promotion 
of human rights and the rule of law. The first obviously attempts to examine the role of 
normative factors in foreign policy decisions and the latter finds out the capability of the 
EU and its Member States in realizing its value-oriented policy. 
 
France 
 
There is something special about France-China relationship thanks to the fact that De 
Gaulle was the first European leader to recognize China. However, there existed clear 
inconsistency in French policy towards China. For example, “France provided refuge to 
 30 
many Chinese dissidents after the Tiananmen crack-down”, and “it was also the first 
unilaterally to breach EEC sanctions only six months later, in December 1989, opting to 
‘change China through engagement’ and support blossoming business relations (Casarini 
and Musu, 2007).” In other words, the initial harsh decision against China was soon 
diluted by realist calculation in foreign policy making. As reflected in the arms embargo 
case, Chirac inherited the tradition of De Gaulle and during his leadership a 
“Comprehensive Partnership Agreement” was established (Joint Sino-French Declaration, 
1997). Trade deals in areas like nuclear energy, aircrafts, and social services were signed 
accordingly and obviously these profitable deals enhanced the bilateral relationship. 
Against this background, it is without doubt that Chirac applied an accommodating 
approach to China’s human rights performance. Furthermore, when Denmark motioned 
for a UN Resolution condemning China for human rights abuse following an internal 
agreement in the EU, France blocked it in order to facilitate a profitable Airbus deal, 
which was also supported by Spain, Italy, Greece and Germany (Schubert, 2002).  
 
In terms of aid programmes which are usually instruments for the promotion of human 
rights and rule of law, France concentrated more on training and academic exchange 
projects that were not sensitive at all compared to aggressive civil society activities. Such 
an approach had definitely diluted France’s capability of changing China’s human right 
situation. No wonder it is argued that France is “one of the Western governments least 
enthused by the democracy promotion agenda (Youngs, 2006)”. 
 
It is expected that France would at least come up with a low-key approach to human 
rights and the rule of law, public shaming or condemn would jeopardize Sino-French 
partnership. Yet, “as indicated in the ‘Comprehensive Partnership Agreement’, France 
pointed to the EU as the most suitable level to discuss the human rights issue with China 
(Balducci, 2010)”, instead of making efforts to build a formal bilateral dialogue to tackle 
human rights issues. In other words, France placed the responsibilities of exerting 
pressure on China to the EU and hoped that the EU could come up with a normative 
foreign policy. It was only in very few occasions that the presidency made statements 
concerning several political refugees and the request for freedom of speech and other 
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civil rights.  
 
The attitude to untie hands from such a burden to maintain public pressure on China’s 
human rights situation was also copied by Italy, Spain and other Mediterranean Member 
States where the liberal democratic tradition was not deeply rooted in their political 
culture. For them, delegating the responsibilities to the EU is a smart alternative to avoid 
direct confrontation with China. 
 
The UK 
 
“The overall UK foreign policy would be characterized by a mixture of idealism and 
pragmatism, pursued through a combination of hard and soft power (Balducci, 2010)”. 
The then Secretary of State Robin Cook announced in his speech that the foreign policy 
of the UK would have an “ethical dimension” with “human rights at its heart” (House of 
Commons, 1999). Yet in practice the ethical dimension was not well addressed. The UK 
maintained a wavering or ambiguous position on human rights issues regarding China, 
just as reflected in the arms embargo case. Nevertheless, in practice the UK did establish 
its human rights dialogue with China and relevant projects in the promotion of human 
rights and the rule of law were also initiated. 
 
A year after Chirac signed the Partnership Agreement with China, a Joint Declaration on 
a “Comprehensive Partnership Agreement” was also sign by the UK and China (Sino-
British Comprehensive Partnership Agreement). With the Sino-British partnership, closer 
economic and trade relations were established. Five years after the signing of this 
“Comprehensive Partnership Agreement”, the two parties enhanced their cooperation and 
signed a “Sino-British Joint Declaration on a Strategic Partnership”, which aimed at 
“further high-level political dialogues and consultations on sustainable development, 
strategic security, development and non-proliferation (Sino-British Strategic Partnership 
Agreement, 2004).” Under such bilateral strategic partnership, we can see that little of the 
political objectives in human rights promotion have been translated into concrete actions. 
This was due to the fierce competition for Chinese markets the UK faced among its 
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European counterparts, notably France and Germany.  
 
The actual promotion of human rights and the rule of law had been in fact left to public 
organizations such as the Great Britain-China Centre and the British Council which 
carried out projects with limited funding in mainly five fields: “abolition of death penalty, 
combating torture, freedom of expression, the rule of law and children’s rights (Balducci, 
2010).” For example, both the Great Britain-China Centre and the British Council had set 
up training schemes of lawyers and judges. Although these efforts showed the UK’s 
commitment to its foreign policy goals in terms of “ethical dimension”, the fact that UK’s 
ODA to China spread among other fields proved that the initial ethical foreign policy 
failed or shifted in practice. 
 
In sum, it can be observed that the UK’s promotion in human rights was limited in a few 
projects operated by public organizations as the government had to take a pragmatic 
approach when its economic competitors were realists in engaging China. The idealism in 
the UK’s foreign policy thus suffered. 
 
Germany 
 
Germany surpassed other Member States in trade and direct investments volume in China. 
Thus, it is particularly essential for Germany to strengthen political and economic 
relationship with China. Thus, Germany does not only conduct its foreign policy at the 
EU level but also independently organizes its projects with specific countries. Similar to 
the UK, Germany focused more on bilateral human rights dialogues. In engaging with 
China, Germany, especially in Schröder’s time, adopted a very realistic approach that 
merely criticized China mildly. In practice, it put a lot of efforts in lawyers- training 
programmes that could promote the rule of law in concrete means. “The German 
government’s most-preferred instrument for the promotion of human rights and the rule 
of law in China was development assistance, in particular technical cooperation in the 
judicial and legal field” and “it is within the technical assistance offered through grants 
and managed by GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) that 
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Germany carried out several projects in the legal and judicial field (Balducci, 2010).” Yet 
it is important to realize the fact that these projects had no pure human rights dimension; 
instead, it focused a lot in business sectors that were profitable. 
 
Although the leadership supports such a positive and pragmatic way and prioritize 
business interests over normative factors, we should bear in mind that public opinion is 
highly critical towards China’s human rights violations. In recent years, Chinese 
dissidents or human rights activists have caught increasing international attention and the 
leadership has to make their open criticism towards China when faced with pressure from 
domestic audience. It is just that the vocal criticism did not change the de facto policy 
implementation. In general, we can conclude that Germany avoids confronting China in 
tackling human rights issues and devote itself to pragmatic promotion of civil rights and 
rule of law in concrete trade projects. 
 
The Netherlands 
 
Just like the “big three,” promoting economic and political relations with China is also 
the key objective of Dutch foreign policy. However, the Dutch government can never get 
around the human rights situation in China. Actually, “the Netherlands as well as the 
Scandinavian countries included human rights promotion in their foreign policies in the 
1970s (Balducci, 2010)”. In the memorandum presented to the Lower House of the States 
General of the Kingdom of the Netherlands by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the 
Minister for Development Co-operation on 3 May 1979, it said “active involvement in 
the human rights situation stems from one of the main principles of Dutch foreign policy: 
solidarity with the people in the rest of the world (Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 
1979).” Besides, the principle of non-selectivity determines that the Netherlands has to 
take the initiative in dealing with human rights violations in a great power like China 
whereas other countries like the UK give priority to less powerful countries with lower 
political risks. Just as Baehr argued, “nobody will speak out against a powerful country 
like China, if the Netherlands and other like-minded countries do not do it (Baehr, 2002)”. 
On top of these guidelines, it is special for the Netherlands that there is a strong and 
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aggressive Tibetan and Taiwanese lobby group based in The Hague which urges the 
Dutch politicians to address the human rights violations in China, just as what the UNPO 
and the Tibet Support Group did in the arms embargo issue. 
 
In 1989, the Dutch government took the initiative for the resolution on China at the 44
th
 
session of the UN General Assembly dealing with the human rights violations. The then 
minister of foreign affairs Hans van den Broek openly and forcefully rejected China’s 
statement that “it would be an unlawful interference in internal affairs to deal with human 
rights abuses in other countries (Baehr, 2002)”. As known to all, these motions by the 
Netherlands and other western countries failed in the Commission. Yet the Dutch did not 
give up and several years later it made another attempt for the EU resolution at the UN 
Commission of Human Rights. As shown in the Dutch delegate’s message “blatant 
disregard for the work of the Human Rights Commission was not good for a super power 
and permanent member of the Security Council” (Baehr, 2002), the Dutch were not at all 
hesitating to be very clear and direct. When France, Germany, Italy and Spain withdrew 
their support for the Resolution, the Dutch were definitely furious as the then Minister 
Hans van Mierlo wrote in a letter to his EU partner that he was “not any longer prepared 
to introduce a resolution on behalf of the EU” and “if the EU was not prepared to 
introduce a resolution on human rights violations in an important country such as China, 
but would go along with introducing resolutions regarding violations in smaller countries 
such as Burma, Zaire and Iran, a selective approach using double standards would be the 
result and the EU would lose its credibility” (Baehr, 2002). 
 
Although as previously discussed, these two resolutions were abandoned due to the 
opposition of the powerful EU countries, they have at least proven the Dutch involvement 
in human rights issues. In addition to efforts with in multilateral framework, the 
Netherlands has also established human rights dialogue with China, “including an official 
dialogue on human rights issues in general and specific cases in China, a legal seminar 
and a cooperation programme with the European Commission (Baehr, 2002)”. Those 
bilateral activities were designed not only to engage China in a constructive approach but 
also to fix the relationship between China and the Netherlands since the Netherland’s 
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firm position in the human rights issues was blamed by China afterwards and thus 
brought negative influence on their diplomatic relationship. Realizing the consequences, 
the Dutch have adopted relatively pragmatic approaches such as dialogues and 
cooperation programmes to strengthen economic and political relations.   
 
Conclusion  
 
The debates and divergences in human rights policy towards China reflect the fact that 
socialization is not yet forming among the EU Member States. Instead, commercial and 
investment competition forces them to put the promotion of human rights and the rule of 
law aside despite of the fact that these countries all place human rights and the rule of law 
at the core of their foreign policy objectives. Consequently, these countries could only 
undertake non-confrontational economic or social projects. Even countries like the 
Netherlands with strong liberal political culture that is most vocal in human rights 
promotion has turned to mild approaches when faced with pressure from the Chinese 
government. Also adopting the strategy of engagement instead of confrontation, the EU 
set up a bilateral human rights dialogue with China in 1996. In addition, promoting good 
governance and the rule of law through an EU-China Civil Society Co-operation 
Programme is part of the plan to improve the overall situation.  
 
However, all these dialogues are facing more or less similar difficulties: “the very rigid 
format of the sessions, absence of high-level participants on the Chinese side, Chinese 
evasiveness when questioned on concrete issues, deficiency of follow-up actions, and the 
lack of any clear progress made on the field following up on the declarations made in the 
meetings (Barysch, 2005).” Hence, the EU and its Member State’s promotion of human 
rights and rule of law in China through dialogues and development programmes has not 
been successful at all. 
 
Also quite interestingly, we can observe a tendency of leaving human rights issues to the 
EU institutions among the major countries such as the “big three”, Spain and Italy. In the 
past years, the European Parliament has been seizing opportunities to make rhetorical 
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criticism on human rights issues as well as addressing the public discontent. The EP is 
after all a powerless institute and by doing so it can at least promote its profile in the 
public. In other words, the EP is making use of the critical aspects of the EU’s foreign 
relations i.e. the human rights issue. For example, “after the 2003 summit, European 
Parliamentarians expressed their disappointment over the failure to mention Tibet and the 
ongoing human rights abuses there in the joint press statement issued after the conclusion 
of the six EU-China Summit held in Beijing” (Casarini and Musu, 2007).  
 
In sum, the “big three” prefer to deal with the human rights issue bilaterally or simply 
leave it to the EU level while smaller States with active human rights promotion could 
not accumulate their power and translate it into a coherent European policy. As argued by 
May-Britt Stumbaum, the EU institutions have to “bow to pressures exerted by both 
China and individual Member States” and “the European Parliament taking the 
opportunity to sharpen its profile in an area in which it has no competence” (Stumbaum, 
2007) 
 
3.3 Promotion of CSR-related Norms 
 
CSR has been a hot issue in political discussions and Europe is perhaps the most vibrant 
region for CSR development. In the 2000 Lisbon Strategy, the EU set the development 
goal as making it as “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and great 
social cohesion (European Council, Lisbon, 23-24 March 2000).” In terms of normative 
expectations, CSR transcends the boundaries of countries and regions. For example, EC 
policy on CSR is of relevance not just within the boundaries of the EU but also for EU 
corporations that operate within China or elsewhere in the developing world (Buhmann, 
2005). The concept of CSR has been embraced by the EU for many strategic reasons and 
the promotion of CRS reflects the need to defend common values and increase the sense 
of solidarity and cohesion (European Commission, 2006). 
 
Criticism towards China and Chinese enterprises in CRS performance is well 
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documented. The promotion of CRS in China is operated by a wide range of actors such 
as national states, multilateral organizations, and NGOs. Here we look at the four 
countries’ policy as well as the Union’s projects in China with a CSR focus and their 
efforts in coming up with common EU actions or participation at the EU level. 
 
France 
 
France is “first country to make public company reporting mandatory (Doucin, 2009)” 
and “the country’s national strategy for sustainable development makes direct reference 
to CSR” (Riess and Welzel, 2006). The range of CSR issues in French standard has now 
become one the most comprehensive in Europe. In a word, domestically the France is 
among the most successful countries in implementing CSR norms and the government 
mandates CSR by its national law. 
 
Yet in terms of activities abroad, France cannot be seen as a successful frontrunner – 
“when it comes to sustainability, in France responsibility for international activities is 
seen less as a matter of CSR and more as an aspect of government development policy 
(Riess and Welzel, 2006).” France’s commitment to the protection for the environment 
and social and economic development was “to draw up a national sustainable 
development strategy (France Diplomatie, 2008)”. Actually, under the theme of 
“sustainable development” on the official website of French Foreign Ministry, we can 
find out that France’s action to foster sustainable development on the international front 
was more or less through existing multilateral framework such as the UN, with a heavy 
focus on environment issues alone.  
 
Bilaterally, Sino-French cooperation is deployed in many directions, but also with a 
French flavor as previously explained – a special focus on environmental issues and 
educational programmes, including the environment and urban planning, such as the 
“establishment of climate and sustainable urban development agreements of 2007, and a 
‘50 urban planners’ scholarship programme in 2009 (France Diplomatie, 2010)”. 
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The UK 
 
The UK is perhaps one of the few countries with the best performance in CSR practice. 
The British government has made a significant contribution. As it officially states, “The 
Government sees CRS as the business contribution to our sustainable development goals. 
The base level of responsible behavior for any organization is legal compliance and the 
Government has a role to play in setting standards in areas such as environmental 
protection, health and safety and employment rights. The Government can also provide a 
policy and institutional framework that stimulates companies to raise their performance 
voluntarily beyond minimum legal standards. Our approach is to encourage and 
incentives the adoption of Corporate Social Responsibility, through best practice 
guidance, and, where appropriate, intelligent, i.e. soft-law regulation and fiscal incentives 
(Steurer, 2010)”. 
 
The UK’s high level of professionalism in CSR performance is not merely reflected in the 
governmental level, but also in the corporate sector and civil society level. Big 
enterprises that are pioneers in raising CSR awareness and famous international 
organizations active actors in relevant fields such as Amnesty International (AI) and the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) are all good examples. The contribution from bottom-up 
can also guarantee that the governmental policies stay highly effective and robust. 
Furthermore, “the creation of a ministerial post for CSR, the only one worldwide, 
demonstrates that CSR is taken very seriously in the UK (Riess and Welzel, 2006)”.  
 
Different from France, in 2005, the British government “introduced a new kind of policy 
framework: the International Strategic Framework now defines the government’s goals 
and priorities for advancing CSR at the national and international level (Riess and Welzel, 
2006)”. Internationally the UK has been operating well under multilateral framework 
such as the UN and the OECD. On top of this, the UK has devoted itself in international 
civil society development in CSR field. Organizations or think tanks supported by the UK 
government includes: the Corporate Responsibility Coalition (CORE) established in 2001, 
the Business in the Community (BITC) –  the leading economic initiative in the CSR 
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domain, the New Economics Foundation (NEF), AccountAbility – an organization 
specializing in social and ethical reporting, SustainAbility – a consultancy think tank in 
business risks and opportunities of CSR, Chatham House (Royal Institute of International 
Affairs) and so forth. Business initiatives that were first raised by the UK and then 
embraced by the international society, such as the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which will be discussed later, are 
other highlights of the British contribution to higher standards corporate transparency in 
resource industry. 
 
In China, the British government has undertaken several CSR projects under its Global 
Opportunity Fund Programme: including “supporting IBLF (International Business 
Leaders Forum) to promote transparent business practices, supporting the Association 
Internationale des Etudiants en Sciences Economiques et Commerciales (AIESEC) to 
raise CSR awareness among China’s leading youth, training officials in partnership with 
the China Executive Leadership Academy Pudong (CELAP), and research projects in the 
Pearl River Delta (Guo, 2008)”. 
 
Germany 
 
In terms of domestic CSR legislation, Germany lags behind its counterparts in Europe, 
especially the UK and France. “Germany needs to catch up, especially in the areas of 
strategic development, the financial sector, business activities abroad and public 
procurement (Riess and Welzel, 2006).” In spite of this sentiment, internationally 
Germany remains a competitive actor in CSR performance. 
 
Initially, Germany’s involvement at the European and international level could be seen as 
passive instead of proactive. Yet gradually it started to make active initiatives. In 2003, 
the UN Secretary-General and the then German Chancellor “invited the executive boards 
of the German members of the Global Compact (GC) to a gathering at the chancellery in 
Berlin – an event that went largely unnoticed by the general public” (Riess and Welzel, 
2006). The gathering was planned to award the contribution of companies involved and 
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campaign for more participators from the business sector. This meeting has definitely 
increased the CSR awareness of Germans through discussion and workshop with 
counterparts from all over the world. 
 
In regards to German’s CSR activities in China, the Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) – Society for Technical Cooperation, the organization which 
coordinates the German GC network on behalf of the Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (BMZ) plays a significant role in CSR promotion.  
 
“German CSR work in China dates back to November 2004 when GTZ organized the 
first Round Table on Social Standards and CSR, in the scope of a public-private 
partnership project with the Foreign Trade Association of the German Retail Trade (AVE) 
(Guo, 2008).” Till 2006, seven roundtables had been held. Also in that year, “GTZ co-
founded the China CSR Map which provides an invaluable service to China’s CSR 
community (Guo, 2008).” In April 2007, Sino-German CSR Project was launched by the 
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China together with GTZ, which was 
the result of a bilateral agreement signed by both sides. This meaning of this project or 
the agreement is special as “it is the first bilateral cooperation project to focus exclusively 
on CSR in China and the core project objectives are to strengthen Chinese government 
institutions with regard to CSR research and dialogue, initiate public-private partnerships 
with Chinese enterprises, and promote international exchange on CSR (Guo, 2008).” 
 
The Netherlands 
 
The Dutch Ministry of Economics is most active in CSR promotion, which clearly 
indicates that CSR is part of the national policy. In 2001, “the Dutch government 
published two strategy papers on CSR: the first was based on a report by the Dutch Social 
and Economic Council, a government advisory committee, and the other appeared in the 
wake of the EU Commission’s CSR green paper (Riess and Welzel, 2006).” CSR work in 
the Netherlands has a special feature thanks to the high level of interaction among 
business sector, the public sector and the civil society, which is a result of top-down 
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efforts to promote integration and social cohesion. 
 
Just like the “big thee”, the Dutch adopted various international guidelines and standards. 
As in developing countries, the Dutch Ministry for Developmental Cooperation “supports 
fair-trade projects, public-private partnerships and CSR initiatives (Riess and Welzel, 
2006).” In terms of bilateral cooperation, the Dutch government has also operated several 
projects within China. For example, it initiated “a training program to disseminate 
advanced theories and best practice of CSR in a collaborative project with the China State 
Information Center (SIC), the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and Amsterdam 
University (Guo, 2008)”. Besides this training program, there were also activities carried 
out in several remote and less developed provinces such as Heilongjiang, Gansu, Shanxi 
and Inner Mongolia as well as in the Netherlands from 2008 to 2010. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Though there are variants in strategies and approaches, the above countries are generally 
doing well in CSR practice domestically and actively carrying out projects abroad, with 
China being an important target. At the European level, most activities or projects are 
supported by “EuropeAid” since 2005. On 12 July 2006, “the EU-China Trade Project 
has implemented a major EU-China CSR Symposium followed by a series of projects in 
the textile industry, aiming to support the development of CSR in a labour intensive 
industry sector that has the potential to act as a model for other labour intensive sectors 
(Guo, 2008)”. This Symposium was held in the context of a “new policy” launched in 
March that year by the Union. The “new policy” had several highlights and one of them 
is “further promoting CSR with an international dimension” (Zourek, 2006). These 
initiatives indicated that the EU had realized the importance of engaging the outside 
world and promote CSR abroad instead of merely inside the Union. Before the 
“EuropeAid” programme, the Commission had External Aid programmes such as the 
“Small Projects Facility”, which funded several projects over China (European 
Commission, 2012). These projects were more the comprehensive aid programme kind 
instead of focusing on CSR alone. 
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There is no divergence among the EU in coming up with such a common EU action. 
Apparently there is no major conflict of interests among the Member States in terms of 
CSR promotion. The notion of sustainability is well received by the European community, 
not just from top-down level, but also from bottom-up level. The active civil society 
groups are also advocating for a better European policy in CSR practice.  
 
In addition to the normative driven force, there are also commercial or economic interests 
involved. The lobby group is not merely from the civil society but also from the business 
sector. Why are national states so interested in CSR promotion at an international level at 
all? According to some scholars, “the soft-law character of CSR and CSR policies implies 
comparatively low political costs in terms of resistance by special interest groups 
compared to hard-law regulations (Moon, 2002)”. In other words, promotion of norms 
like sustainability and social responsibility has lower political costs and would not lead to 
direct confrontation with target countries. An active campaign or promotion in China 
would not bring any negative influence in the foreign relations. This is of course an 
important reason, but from another perspective, it is generally accepted that the European 
states are the ones with much better CSR performance; thus, under a common voluntary 
regulation or standard, the European cooperate sector membership can easily win over 
other players. Or more frankly, the promotion of CSR at an international level, or 
developing countries in particular, can increase the costs of others and thus strengthen 
self-competitiveness economically. This further explains why it is easy for the EU to 
come up with a Common Policy in CSR promotion. 
 
Yet it should not be ignored that not all Member States are advanced in CSR performance. 
As introduced by Heinz Zourek, the Director General for Enterprise and Industry of the 
Commission, “there are also significant variations between Member States: some member 
states have sought to promote CSR on a wide scale, and have taken initiatives such as 
developing a national CSR standard (e.g. Austria), introducing CSR reporting 
requirements for some companies (e.g. France) and launching national dialogues on CSR 
(Spain, Germany); in most of the Member States that joined the EU in 2004, however, 
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CSR is relatively less well advanced, and consumers, civil society and governments are 
less active in demanding or encouraging it (Zourek, 2006)”. This can explained the minor 
setbacks within the Union in CSR practice. For example, the proposal “to establish a 
platform for dialogue among the main stakeholder groups at European level: employers’ 
organizations, trade unions, and civil society groups (Zourek, 2006)” failed in 2002. 
 
Consequently, a common EU normative policy is relatively easy to be launched in low 
politics issues such as the promotion of CSR despite the variations among Member States.  
 
Nevertheless, the variations of development among all the Member State do stay as an 
obstacle if further proposals were raised.  Different national preferences and domestic 
conditions are sometimes the reasons that stop initiatives from being translated to actual 
policies. For example, a proactive EU CSR framework was jointly proposed by the 
Swedish and Spanish leadership in November 2009 that: “Over the recent years the 
European Union and its member states have recognized CSR as a key element in 
fostering a truly sustainable economy, building on the Lisbon Strategy and on the 
recommendations and work of the European parliament and European Commission. Now 
the time is ripe to take this important work further by developing common frameworks… 
The responsibility is threefold: the state duty to protect – including legislation as well as 
implementation of human rights obligations, in particular with regard to business; the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and the responsibility of all parties to 
ensure access to adequate remedies to uphold and develop such human rights. (ECCJ, 
2010)” However, this three-hold responsibility has not yet been taken by the Union and 
all the Member States. 
 
3.4 Raw Materials Diplomacy 
 
The idea that “CSR standards or other references texts are better developed at global level 
(Zourek, 2006)” has made the EU dedicated to the promotion of international standards 
and norms outside the Europe. Among all those activities and initiatives, there are ones 
that have extended the boundaries of CSR and brought a lot of controversies, the EITI for 
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instance, which brings up the concept of “resource curse” and thus heated discussion over 
this already sensitive issue. 
 
In 2002, the EITI was announced by Tony Blair, the then-Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa as the future 
transparency standard worldwide. The EITI is one of the international “soft law” tools to 
curb corruption and help resource-rich countries benefit from the revenues from their soil 
(Ölcer, 2009). Now 30 (EITI website figures) resource-rich countries and a great many 
extractive corporations had signed up the EITI. A number of governments, including 
those of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
plus the European Union, support the EITI (EITI website). Besides, the World Bank, the 
Group of 8, the International Monetary Fund, institutional investors, a number of 
multilateral organizations and civil society also provides help and support through 
various means. Thus, “as a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, 
investors and international organizations promoting transparency in payments made by 
extractive companies and revenues received by governments, the founders expected that 
governance and accountability would improve in these countries and ultimately lead to a 
larger share of revenues being spent on economic growth and poverty reduction (Ölcer, 
2009)”. The EITI has displayed the concerns of the EU and other actors in the resource-
dependent world. Yet, initiatives like the EITI are far from enough to meet the EU’s 
demand. The EU has to come up with more aggressive strategies to address the severe 
situation in global race of resources. 
 
In 2009, the EU, the US as well as Mexico had challenged China’s export restrictions on 
nine different raw materials and argued that those restrictions could not support 
environmental grounds. The WTO dispute settlement panel stated that China’s restrictive 
export policies violated both the prohibition of all quantitative restrictions in the GATT 
agreement and China’s additional vow to eliminate all export tariffs. Tensions between 
rapid and sustainable economic growth and the urgent demands for environment and 
natural resource protection have been one of China’s greatest challenges since its 
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economic boom. In dealing with this delicate balance, China has been increasing its 
restriction in exporting in the last few years, measures of which include export VAT 
rebates, export taxes, licenses, and quotas on raw materials. Officially, the government 
claims that these policies are for environment protection purposes and they are made to 
develop China’s green economy. Yet to the West, these policies are actually served for 
ensuring domestic market supply and providing domestic enterprises unfair advantages.  
 
The controversies over China’s export restrictions bring us to another hot issue in EU-
China relations: the raw materials race. The race for world’s raw materials has become 
tougher since China’s economic booming and the competition is getting fierce with other 
emerging economies such as India and Brazil. Fourteen critical raw materials were 
identified by the EU in a Commission report, including: antimony, beryllium, cobalt, 
fluorspar, gallium, germanium, graphite, indium, magnesium, niobium, platinum group 
metals, rare earths, tantalum and tungsten (EC: Report of the Ad-hoc Working Group 
Defining Critical Raw Materials, July 2010). The distribution of their production 
worldwide can be seen from the graph below. 
 
 
Source: Report of the Ad-hoc Working Group on defining critical raw materials, Version of 30 July 2010, 
the European Commission 
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As explained in the report and the graph above, China has a large share of world 
production in most of the fourteen critical minerals. Consequently, it is reasonable for the 
EU to fear a situation where China restricts exports of strategic minerals. As stated in the 
World Trade Report 2010, “fears of inadequate access to supplies in resource-scarce 
countries and of inappropriate exploitation in resource-rich regions could lead to trade 
conflict or worse” (Gregow, 2011). Actually we can see this happening: the tension 
between China and the EU has been raised in recent years due to the WTO dispute.  
 
Against this background, the EU has been working on its “raw material supply strategy”, 
with of course a European normative flavour: “Europe needs to maintain and gain access 
to raw materials from third countries, but it aims at doing so in a way that is fair to both 
sides, and creates win-win situations (Enterprise & Industry magazine, 2011).” To 
achieve this aim, the EU has come up with the “raw materials diplomacy”, which means 
“the promotion of good governance, human rights, conflict resolution, non-proliferation 
and regional stability in resource-rich countries (Enterprise & Industry magazine, 2011).”  
Accordingly, the key elements of the “raw material supply strategy” include: 
 
- “Regularly updating the list of critical raw materials already identified by the 
European Commission; 
- Monitoring the development of access to critical raw materials with the view to 
identifying priority actions; 
- Strengthening the EU’s raw materials trade strategy and engaging in ‘raw 
materials diplomacy’; 
- Developing bilateral co-operation with African countries in the area of raw 
materials, based on promoting good governance, investment and geological 
knowledge and skills; 
- Improving the regulatory framework for sustainable extraction within the EU; 
- Enhancing resource efficiency and promoting recycling; 
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- Promoting further research and innovation efforts along the entire value chain of 
raw materials, from extraction, processing, recycling and resource efficiency to 
substitution.” (Enterprise & Industry magazine, 2011) 
 
There are certainly corollaries to these aspects; most obviously for example, the 
environmental impacts of the EU’s extractive industries would supposedly be mitigated 
as CSR norms are regarded as the comparative advantage of the EU. Also, research and 
educational projects in extractive fields would be enhanced. In terms of social 
development impacts, we can imagine more comprehensive governance practices. In the 
raw material diplomacy case, we mainly examine the four exemplar countries’ raw 
material strategy at the national level and their positions or attitude in the above 
mentioned common EU raw material diplomacy. 
 
France 
 
There is no English document of France’s raw material strategy available on the official 
website of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, at the European 
Environment Agency’s country profile, information on resource strategy could be found, 
the “Strategic Metals Plan” (EEA, 2011) for instance. Following this Plan, a Committee 
was also set up in January 2011, working for enhancing the resource recycling system 
and international cooperation. The French government is fully aware of its dependence of 
raw materials and the identification of critical ones was also part of the efforts. While the 
emphasis remains domestic policy in mining and recycling, the French government 
considers fostering partnership with major exporters of great importance. 
 
According to the observation and analysis conducted by the British government, 
“France’s Strategic Metals Plan stresses the need to identify the areas which make France 
vulnerable to resource scarcity and determine how to remedy the situation. The strategy 
also states the government’s aspiration to extend geological knowledge with targeted 
exploration campaigns for strategic metals. The promotion of sustainable exploitation, 
development of new tools for use in exploration and the investigation of ways to make 
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the extraction and the transformation of strategic metals easier are also aims of the 
strategy. Furthermore, it aims to look at the recycling policy for strategic metals and 
strengthen governmental action by appointing a senior civil servant for strategic metals 
(DEFRA, 2012)”.  
 
The UK 
 
The UK does not have a dedicated raw material strategy either.  As explained on the EEA 
country profile though, the UK has made a “Sustainable Development Strategy” in 2005 
(EEA, 2011) and its overall policy adopts a business approach. Just like the way it 
promotes CSR, the UK develops its resource efficiency strategy by encouraging best 
practice, setting standards, and leading by examples. 
 
The WRAP (Waste & Resource Action Programme) plays the most significant role in 
supporting the government’s strategy. It “provides advice and support on material 
resource efficiency in the UK so that householders, businesses, civil society organizations, 
local authorities and the public sector can save money and make better use of resources 
(EEA, 2011).” 
 
The newly founded government is outlining key policies actively, in resource security 
particularly. It made commitment in publishing “an action plan on resource security to 
assist business with strategic risk management and recovery of critical resources (EEA, 
2011)”. There are common solutions shared among most European countries such as 
building stronger and better relationship with the resource suppliers and developing new 
technologies to increase resource efficiency; yet still, as just mentioned, the UK has some 
highlights next to these actions. It aims to achieve this goal through the efforts from 
individual economic sectors. It sees transparency, training or education of the public, and 
best practice of businesses vital in the overall strategy. Therefore, the UK sets out many 
voluntary agreements among the stakeholders.   
 
Germany 
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Different from France and the UK, Germany has it own raw material strategy titled “The 
German Government’s Raw Material Strategy - Safeguarding a Sustainable Supply of 
Non-energy Resources for Germany” (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 
2010). In this document, critical materials were also identified with a reference to the 
fourteen critical materials in the EC’s report. More specifically, the German’s document 
made an in-depth assessment of the role emerging technologies could play in reshaping 
the demand and supply relationship. In this document, similar approaches such as 
increasing resource efficiency and recycling, diversifying supply from various channels, 
as well as establishing partnership with producers could be found. Furthermore, the 
German strategy has highlighted the political support the government would provide to 
the business sector.  Ensuring a stable price and access through political and financial 
means would be the role of the German government, such as signing bilateral agreement 
and funding extractive industry. 
 
The Netherlands 
 
The Dutch government also has a raw material strategy of its own. The “Dutch 
Government Policy Document on Raw Materials” is available on the website of the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this document, a thorough analysis of the supply 
demand relationship, the Dutch position in the multi-polar system, and the prospectus of 
investing in sustainability were made as the background information. The Dutch have 
their own concerns in the raw material strategy due to its status as an important centre for 
logistics of imports and exports. This explains why in this document, “free trade and open 
market system” was highlighted as one of the objectives the government should achieve. 
At the same time, being a relatively smaller state, the Netherlands emphasizes the 
principle of “European where possible, national where necessary and where it offers 
opportunities” (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). It stresses that individual 
country would not be able to counter this problem alone; thus, the Netherlands is “keen to 
see a strong European policy aimed at promoting an open trading system” (Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). It further claims that “where the EU has the necessary 
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competence, the Netherlands will actively encourage policy formation (Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2012)”. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Fitting the above mentioned raw material diplomacy strategic framework, the RMI is 
accordingly brought out as a common EU strategy to counter the competitive 
disadvantage of EU’s businesses and industries. In November 2008, the European 
Commission presented a Communication to the European Parliament and the Council 
named “The Raw Materials Initiative – Meeting Our Critical Needs for Growth and Jobs 
in Europe”, aiming at providing a policy response to Europe’s growing concerns 
regarding access to raw materials, given the increasing global demand from new 
emerging powers and the likely possible supply shortages that this could entail (Ramdoo, 
2011). The Initiative proposed an integrated strategy to guarantee sufficient market access 
to raw materials at a fair price and on non-discriminatory terms. It is based on three 
pillars: access to raw materials on world markets at undistorted conditions, sustainable 
supply of raw materials from European sources and reducing EU’s consumption of 
primary raw materials (COM 2008 /699: “The Raw Materials Initiative – Meeting Our 
Critical Needs for Growth and Jobs in Europe”).  
 
In February 2011, a new Communication was unveiled, termed “Tackling the Challenges 
in Commodity Markets and on Raw Materials”, this time with a wider scope to address 
policies in areas of financial markets, development, trade, industry and external relations. 
The new Communication addresses issues linked to commodities markets, including 
energy (oil, gas and electricity), agriculture and security of food supply as well as raw 
materials. It has also proposed new areas of action in the three pillars previously 
mentioned. In this Communication, the EU further reinforced its pursuit of “raw materials 
diplomacy”: an open campaign against export restrictions. More specifically, “the EU 
will work with other international institutions to foster dialogue for a better understanding 
of the impact of export restrictions on raw materials markets, will further embed removal 
of trade and investment restrictions in trade negotiations at all levels, will establish a 
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monitoring mechanism for exports restrictions and will use autonomous measures against 
third countries in bilateral and multilateral frameworks (Ramdoo, 2011).” 
 
The EC argues that “there is a proliferation of government measures that distort 
international trade in raw materials and such ‘trade distorting’ measures include export 
taxes and quotas, subsidies, price-fixing, dual pricing as well as restrictive investment 
rules (Gregow, 2011).” The Commission claims that “China, Russia, Ukraine, Argentina, 
South Africa and India are among the key countries involved in applying such measures 
(Ibid).” In the Communication “The Raw Materials Initiative – Meeting Our Critical 
Needs for Growth and Jobs in Europe”, the determination of EU to counter such 
protective measures is quite strong and obvious: 
 
“The EU should work towards the elimination of trade distorting measures taken by 
third countries in all areas relevant to access to raw materials. The EU will take 
vigorous action to challenge measures which violate WTO or bilateral rules, using all 
mechanisms and instruments available, including enforcement through the use of 
dispute settlement. More generally, the EU will act against the protectionist use of 
export restrictions by third countries. In determining its actions, the EU will take as 
priority those export restrictions that pose the greatest problems for EU user 
industries or give their domestic downstream industries an unfair competitive 
advantage on international markets.” (COM 2008/699) 
 
In other words, confrontation with China would be inevitable under this Initiative, which 
suggests that when vital self-interest is concerned, the EU would come up with a 
common strategy even though it might bring some negative consequenecs with China. 
From the discussion above, it is clear that all these countries are resource-dependent and 
are aware of the severe situation at the moment. Though there are minor differences in 
national resource/raw material strategies, they are all seeking to guarantee stable access 
to raw materials and increase resource efficiency. The removal of trade barriers and the 
idea of green economy or sustainable development fall right in line with the European 
value in trade liberation and sustainability, which means the costs of political campaigns 
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would be relatively lower. Therefore, there are no major obstacles in coming up with such 
a common strategy. 
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Chapter 4   China’s Perception 
 
It should be made clear that perception from the Chinese side varies from different walks 
of life. The government officials, social elites, scholars and main-stream media could be 
grouped as one category as generally they have better knowledge of the EU and relevant 
background information and their understanding of the EU largely affects the policy 
preferences of China. They also dominate the mass propaganda which serves the interests 
of the regime. Their perception could be analyzed from the official documents, interviews 
and major media reports or articles. While scholars, especially European Studies experts, 
generally have more knowledge of the EU than ordinary people and have a say in shaping 
the policy outcome. Their perception could be observed from academic literature in 
European Studies in China. As for the ordinary citizens, it is unrealistic to expect them to 
know a lot about the EU, not to mention every single Member State. However, their 
general impression of the EU would be an effective touchstone of the EU’s normative 
power. Their perception, thus, would be generalized from public survey conducted by 
research institutions or relevant programmes. This chapter, therefore, will focus on these 
two categories of Chinese audiences, and attempt to compare their differences, and draw 
some implications regarding whether the EU is successful or not in projecting its 
normative power. 
 
4.1 Perception of the Chinese Authorities 
 
Generally speaking, the Chinese authorities consider the EU inefficient in adopting 
common foreign policy towards China. Thus, although they are aware of the fact that the 
EU is eager to project its normative power, they do not believe the EU is capable of doing 
so. As most European studies experts have argued, the conflicts of interests and 
preferences among the Member States would eventually keep the EU from making 
serious commitments to the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, democracy and so 
forth. This is confirmed by interviews with governmental officials and public opinion 
leaders. Especially in the case of the arms embargo and the human rights issues, they 
believe that the EU has inefficient decision-making procedures; thus it would be rather 
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difficult to come up with common actions towards China. Furthermore, in the eyes of 
most Chinese officials, criticism made by European leaders is merely a response to 
domestic pressure from the parliament or the public and those leaders are very cautious in 
making further severe actions. In other words, the Chinese authorities see the EU, or 
more accurately, the EU Member States as realistic actors in decision-making and policy 
implementation. Commitments to politically sensitive norms such as democracy, the rule 
of law and human rights would not prioritize over economic interests if they are at the 
expense of the bilateral relationship. 
 
However, when talking about norms such as sustainability or CSR, the Chinese 
authorities would not share the above attitude. They are well aware of the nature and 
implications of these norms and of course the commercial drives behind these norms. 
Thus, the Chinese authorities have a two-way strategy to respond to the EU’s activities: 
on the one hand improving its performance in CSR and sustainability by actively 
adopting international initiatives and developing its own standards, and on the other hand 
revealing the true motivation of the Western initiatives to the Chinese citizens through is 
mass propaganda. 
 
Taking the EITI as an example, China has responded positively since the establishment of 
EITI. The content of the EITI and its implications are well explained to the mass 
audience through many channels. Yet, it is rather difficult to conclude simply whether the 
Chinese government is supporting the EITI or not. The attitude is ambiguous as on the 
one hand, the government has been continuously reporting news on EITI on the official 
website of Ministry of Commerce while on the other hand China has not joined the EITI 
itself. In some speeches, Chinese leadership has acknowledged the importance of 
transparency and third party-supervision in extractive industries; yet there is no official 
acknowledgement of the Initiative itself. On top of official news reports, the Chinese 
translation of the original Initiative is also published on major websites relevant to 
resource management or CSR. For example, on the CSR-China Net, there is one column 
named “Zhishi (Knowledge)”, which contains all relevant information such as voluntary 
standards, research reports, policy and regulations, and so forth. A brief introduction with 
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a full content of the EITI is posted in October 2009 under the topic “voluntary standards”. 
The Chinese version of many EITI-relevant reports by different organizations and think-
tanks can also be found on major websites such as Sina and Sohu. Not only on 
knowledge of EITI itself, the government and public media have also reported on 
conferences and seminars on EITI related issues as well as speeches made there. These 
information flows have definitely increased the awareness of transparency issues in 
extractive industries and brought a lot discussion in academia and the media field. 
 
Most scholars and opinion leaders appear to support the basic idea of EITI and they have 
made in-depth discussions on the implications of EITI for China. Literature regarding the 
EITI has made very positive comments. It is believed that the design of resource 
management system is crucial for a resource rich country to have a “resource bless” 
instead of a “resource curse”. A scholar who supports the idea of EITI and claims that 
“natural resource should be owned by the public and argues that most Chinese enterprises 
are lacking self-discipline and the government is not supervising well enough (Zhou, 
2011).” Others criticize the governments’ contradicting efforts at home and abroad, which 
the author named “the Chinese paradox of extraction industry transparency (Ju, 2011).” 
Basically he thinks it is odd that mostly China has been following the international norms 
and regulations positively in order to build its reputation abroad. He agrees that 
transparency is essential to prevent corruption and supports the EITI: “Perhaps people 
may argue that this Initiative is made by the West to limit the rising developing countries 
for political purposes and the EITI could indeed increase the cost of Chinese investments 
in extractive industries. Nevertheless, we should realize that this nitiative is valued by 
more and more excellent TNCs and countries. More and more wise parties are joining in 
the Initiative or supporting its implementation (Ju, 2011).” The biggest contradiction, the 
author points out, is that China is not doing the same at home while it follows the 
nitiative to some extent when China is doing business in relevant countries. In other 
words, the government has not provided enough protection to the local inhabitants and 
supervision over local enterprises has lacked severely. Thus, if China can implement the 
EITI well at home, China would not pay that many costs in extractive industry. There is 
also literature focusing on the implications of EITI for China as they consider the EITI as 
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a helpful tool for the risk-control in China’s foreign investments. To adopt the 
international standard and maintain sustainable resource development can help lower the 
risks for China’s business abroad. In other words, transparency is in China’s interests for 
its enterprises abroad, especially in mining and other resource industry. The government 
is responsible for most crucial issues in resource extraction industries and China should 
gradually develop a sound management system that can prepare itself for the EITI 
requirements. In addition, the authors advocate that Chinese enterprises should learn host 
countries’ practice in EITI and actively cooperate with relevant parties, which can help 
build good reputation and smooth the progress of their projects.  
 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Chinese authorities fully welcome the Western 
initiatives. As mentioned above, the government also keeps informing the public of the 
so-called “conspiracy of the West”. Thus, suspicion over the EITI could be found in 
main-stream media channel and scholars’ works from think-tanks that have closer 
relationship with the central government. In an interview, a famous scholar Li Anshan 
from Peking University explained that there were three possible reasons behind the fact 
that the international society pushes China to join the EITI: 1) The EITI is progressing 
smoothly, and countries such as China and India that have not yet joined it have hindered 
the implementation of this plan; thus it is necessary to include China in this Initiative; 2) 
This program is still in its infancy and its effect is not clear yet; therefore China and India 
should join and promote the implementation of the Initiative; and 3) The starting point of 
EITI is problematic, which leads to the fact that it has not been recognized by the 
majority of resource rich countries. He further argued that according to his observations, 
the third case would be the most-likely one. Such a cleavage between scholars is the 
reflection of China’s two-way strategy in responding to the EU’s promotion in low-
politics norms. Yet even those who reckon the EU as best performer and advocates of the 
CSR initiatives do not see the EU as a normative power since they are also aware of the 
commercial interests behind these initiatives. It is the belief that the costs are worth-
paying that makes them strongly supports these norms. 
 
China’s propaganda in revealing the so-called “conspiracy of the West” is best reflected 
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in China’s response to the RMI. Main-stream media such as Renmin Net and Xinhua Net 
have been publishing news comments regarding RMI, mostly negative. 
 
Attacks such as those on the RMI are frequently focused on the EU’s selfish developing 
strategy and its contradictory stances to its own trade policies are the most frequently 
appeared ones. This is the most popular judgment of RMI in media reports. They believe 
that the RMI is primarily structured to feed EU’s appetite for raw materials. They argue 
that China’s restriction of some raw materials is out of environmental concerns since the 
negative externalities of resource extraction and trade, such as environmental damage, 
biodiversity loss and increased CO2 emissions are more worrying. They further point out 
that while the EU is always describing itself as a pioneer in environment protection, it 
puts environmental issues aside when it its core interests might be harmed. They argue 
that such a contradictory attitude is not only seen from this selfish motive but also from 
its own trade policies. For example, under the current Euro crisis, the EU is putting a lot 
of efforts in anti-dumping and protecting its own enterprises by keeping foreign goods 
out of the EU’s market. Nevertheless, the EU is requiring other countries open the market 
for its own need in the meantime. In addition, they believe that the RMI is fundamentally 
aiming at increasing the competitiveness of European companies. In order to help 
European companies to better access raw materials in resource rich countries, the RMI 
focuses on removing barriers from their domestic policies, leaving aside the legitimate 
environmental regulations or measures taken by resource rich countries upon extraction 
industries. The fact that the EU is playing against its former stance clearly reflects its 
political bias towards corporate interests, especially under the current economic crisis. 
 
In sum, the Chinese authorities see the EU as an insistent player in the promotion of 
norms such as human rights, democracy, the rule of law and sustainability. The conflicts 
among the Member States, in particular, make the convergence of the EU normative 
power rather difficult. Therefore, by blaming the EU for its double standards and 
revealing the “true face” of the West, Chinese authorities strongly doubt the EU’s 
commitment to those ideational factors and emphasize this fact in its mass propaganda, 
which, in their mind setting, could enhance its regime stability. 
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4.2 Perception of the Chinese Citizens 
 
Demonstrations and mass appeals to boycott French brands and goods around the 2008 
Beijing Olympic Games were mostly out of the anger of the Chinese citizens with regard 
to incidents regarding human rights issues: the then President Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision 
to meet with Dalai Lama and his claim that France might boycott Olympics, as well as 
the disruption of the Olympic torch relay in Paris. The torch relay was protested not only 
in France, but by advocates of Tibetan independence and activists protesting against 
China’s human rights record in several countries. The demonstrations in China were seen 
as the rise of nationalism. Yet there were arguments saying that it was a result of top-
down propaganda aimed at maintain regime stability. However, it is not our focus to 
examine why the demonstrations occurred or whether the protests of the citizens indicate 
a negative attitude towards Europe. We need to know if the Chinese citizens view the EU 
and its Member States as a normative power. 
 
Observations would most be based on existing survey data and focused group interviews 
carried out by research institutes and China-EU projects, as well as empirical 
observations from social resources such as information from social media and social 
network platforms. Nevertheless, the notion of normative power is relatively new and not 
familiar with most Chinese citizens. Thus, it is rather difficult to come up with a simple 
question in conducting surveys or to find discussion exclusively focusing on the EU’s 
normative power among the mass. Thus, indirect perceptions of the EU’s self-
performance in relevant fields and the EU’s activities in China will be investigated 
instead.  
 
In 2010, a “Chinese Views of EU” public survey was carried out by a theme research of 
the “Seventh Framework Programme” initiated by the Commission. The survey was 
based on 2410 questionnaires from six cities in China aiming to analyze Chinese citizens’ 
attitudes toward the EU. This theme research indicates that a majority of ordinary 
Chinese citizens perceive that the EU plays “a positive role in the world regarding all six 
 59 
domains presented in the questionnaire. Most positive is the perception of the EU role in 
scientific progress, followed by its role in environment protection, international economy 
and peace, fighting international terrorism, and fighting poverty in the world (Dekker and 
van der Noll, 2011).” Also, “a small majority of the respondents like the European ideas 
and promotion of democracy (Dekker and van der Noll, 2011).” This indicates a general 
impression of the EU as an active and powerful player in scientific progress, sustainable 
development, as well as international peace and justice. There is also a great percentage 
of people consider the EU as a good performer in “political governance, environment, 
social welfare, and quality of life (Dekker and van der Noll, 2011).” Thus, it can be 
concluded that in the eyes of most Chinese citizens, the EU is doing quite well in 
domains such as peace, democracy, sustainable development and good governance. 
 
While the Chinese citizens do find the EU an active player in human rights issues, many 
interviewees in focused group interviews felt that “the Europeans were seeking to make 
use of the Tibet issue as a political tool to check China” and “not really for democracy 
and liberty” (Tang, 2011). Such opinions are based on the claim that China’s sovereignty 
and core interests should be harmed by external players.  
 
As for the EU’s activities in less political sensitive issues such as the CSR promotion, the 
Chinese citizens are much less critical. For example, plenty of articles and comments 
from mass media as well as online forums have explained the successful performance of 
exemplar countries which has joined the EITI and hoped that China could implement it 
home and abroad to prevent corruption and better manage resource industry. At the same 
time, the public is also aware of the consequences and challenges. Comments of the 
possible costs and challenges China faces in joining the EITI can be found in major 
websites having a business focus. The Chinese citizens see the EU as the pioneer and best 
practice in CSR and supports relevant initiatives. While this of course reflects the EU’s 
good performance in these domains, it definitely indicates the discontents of Chinese 
citizens with China’s severe situation in environmental pollution, labor standard, 
corruption and so forth. 
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In a nutshell, ordinary Chinese citizens view the EU positively as a region enjoying good 
governance, democracy, liberty, and sustainable development. While in the international 
world, it has been playing an important role in maintaining peace and justice, relieving 
international poverty and promoting sustainability. Despite of negative opinions on the 
EU’s activities in human rights promotion, Chinese citizens do see the EU as an active 
player in projecting its normative power. 
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Chapter 5   Conclusion 
 
5.1 Implications and Limitation of the Study  
 
By examining the notion of NPE in selected cases on human rights issues, the arms 
embargo, and the promotion of CSR, this thesis argues that the notion of NPE as well as 
ideational factors have their limits in explaining EU’s foreign policies toward China and 
explains the lack of convergence in a common normative policy towards China. The most 
significant reason behind the shortcomings of NPE is that the member states and EU 
institutions still have heterogeneous interests and norms dealing with China, who may 
have perceived these shortcomings as disunity within EU and tried to neutralize the 
normative pressures from EU by bargaining with some EU members individually. 
However, although normative factor is far from being the only consequential power in the 
decision-making of EU’s foreign policies, its profound influence has become a principal 
catalyst in shaping EU-China relations. This thesis therefore provides a much needed 
analysis of how ideational factors affect EU’s China policy-making.  
 
While this thesis has contributed to the literature of the EU’s normative power in terms of 
foreign relations, it also contributes to the study of the EU’s promotion of its values and 
norms in China. First, it has provided a theoretically grounded discussion of the notion of 
NPE and EU’s foreign policy making towards China. Secondly, it provides a more in-
depth analysis of the EU and its Member States’ engagement with China through case 
studies in both high politics and low politics issues, which is usually not included in 
previous literature. Lastly, it has displayed the Chinese perception of NPE, from the 
authorities’ perspective as well as ordinary citizens’ perspective. In addition, the 
relevance of this thesis could extend beyond EU-China relations, providing conclusions 
interesting to those studying any aspect of EU external policy-making toward other 
countries. 
 
Nevertheless, restricted by time and resource available for this study, this thesis has 
several shortcomings as well. First and foremost, it would suffer from its simplicity in 
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treating the multiple actors in EU foreign policy making and excluding many 
international actors beyond EU and China. The interaction between other regional actors 
and great powers would also have leverage on EU’s foreign policy, especially the Trans-
Atlantic relationship, as could be seen from the arms embargo case. Secondly, the time-
framework of relevant cases is another big challenge. To include all major events in the 
past years would be a huge amount of work. Thus, in this research, only featuring events 
and major activities have been selected, which, would definitely harm the 
comprehensiveness of this study. Lastly, restricted by time and resources, direct social 
survey on Chinese perception of NPE is not possible. Otherwise, a more accurate 
reflection of China’s understanding could be provided in the fourth chapter. A Future 
research model should address these issues and include a more comprehensive analysis. 
 
5.2 Concluding Remarks 
 
The hypotheses posed at the beginning have been tested by the selected cases. Great 
powers that have more stakes involved are less likely to prioritize normative interests. 
While it is true that states are not willing to sacrifice economic interests at the expense of 
norms promotion, states that have a strong liberal political culture or with strong political 
lobby groups that advocate for certain values, have no choice but to prioritize normative 
interests, as can be seen from the case of the Netherlands and Nordic countries. Besides, 
the Member States can easily achieve consensus in low politics issues where political 
costs are much lower in projecting normative power. 
 
The previous discussion also suggests that selected Member States are adept in balancing 
economic and normative interests. The EU can only project normative power when 
normative interests are privileged over others by powerful Member States. More 
importantly, the case studies show that in principle the EU Member States use the EP or 
the EC as an additional tool, which means when vital self-interests are at stake, they 
would give up a coherent EU normative policy; and when their interests do not conflict 
much, such as in the cases of CSR promotion and raw material diplomacy, they would 
strive for a common European policy or action that would strengthen the EU’s 
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negotiating power against an increasingly strong China. Such a lack of support from 
Member States of course results in the inability of the Union to push forward effective 
policy towards China with a normative nature. Accordingly, the normative power of the 
EU originates from congruence, rather than convergence of the Member States. 
 
However, since liberal political culture does have leverage in policy making, it could be 
expected that with the on-going socialization within the EU, as well as the increase of 
external expectations, the EU would have to find a better way to exert its normative 
power. 
 
Although Chinese authorities do not see the EU as an adequate normative power and to 
some extent benefit from the structural weakness of the EU, they are also aware of the 
fact that the EU has been very successful in norms promotion it several domains. The 
Chinese propaganda in revealing the inconsistency of the West would probably be a bitter 
experience of the EU and at the same time another reason for the EU to abandon the 
discordance within the Union. The EU, in many Chinese citizens’ eyes, has already had 
the sound basis for exerting normative power. Thus, how to better balance the economic 
and normative power and how to make better use of its normative power would be the 
urgent. 
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